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Article
Changing Scientific Evidence
Edward K. Chengt
[Tihe Areopagites . . . , finding themselves perplexed with a
cause they could not unravel, ordered the parties to appear
again in a hundred years.
-Montaigne 1
Wisdom too often never comes, and so one ought not to reject it
merely because it comes late.
-Justice Felix Frankfurter
2
The fiasco surrounding the silicone breast implant litiga-
tion is well known.3 In 1984, a San Francisco jury awarded a
plaintiff $1.7 million against Dow Corning for a form of
autoimmune disease allegedly caused by Dow Corning's im-
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1. WILLIAM HAZLITT, THE WORKS OF MICHAEL DE MONTAIGNE:
COMPRISING HIs ESSAYS, LETTERS, AND JOURNEY THROUGH GERMANY AND
ITALY 504 (Charles Cotton trans., 1850).
2. Henslee v. Union Planters Bank & Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949)
(per curiam) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
3. For a more detailed account of the silicone breast implant litigation,
see MARCIA ANGELL, SCIENCE ON TRIAL: THE CLASH OF MEDICAL EVIDENCE
AND THE LAW IN THE BREAST IMPLANT CASE 69-85 (1996) and David E. Bern-
stein, The Breast Implant Fiasco, 87 CAL. L. REV. 457 (1999) (reviewing
ANGELL, supra).
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plants.4 At the time, scientific findings on the adverse health
effects of silicone were at best preliminary, consisting mainly of
anecdotal reports.5 But litigation continued despite the absence
of a substantial body of scientific data. In 1991, just one month
after an advisory panel for the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) found that more research was needed to assess the
safety of silicone implants,6 another jury awarded $7.3 million
to a plaintiff against Dow Corning for allegedly causing mixed
connective tissue disease.7
Major medical research into the hazards of silicone im-
plants did not even begin until 1992,8 when the FDA imposed
an interim ban.9 This "time-out" at the FDA to collect epidemi-
ological data, however, only served to fuel a subsequent explo-
sion of litigation.0 In late 1992, a Houston jury awarded yet
another plaintiff $25 million, this time against Bristol-Myers
Squibb." Facing potentially staggering liability, Dow Corning
entered into a $4.2 billion class settlement in September 1994.12
Only after these massive verdicts did the scientific evi-
dence regarding silicone breast implants become increasingly
4. Richard A. Nagareda, In the Aftermath of the Mass Tort Class Action,
85 GEO. L.J. 295, 331 (1996). Before the appeals stage had concluded, Dow
Corning settled in an agreement that included a protective order against dis-
closure by the plaintiff. Id.
5. See ANGELL, supra note 3, at 52 (describing an anecdotal report from
Australia of three implanted women who suffered from connective tissue dis-
ease).
6. The panel recommended, however, that silicone implants should re-
main on the market in the interim due to their psychological benefits for re-
cipients. Nagareda, supra note 4, at 332.
7. Id.; see also ANGELL, supra note 3, at 118-25 (providing details on this
second litigation).
8. ANGELL, supra note 3, at 27.
9. See David A. Kessler, The Basis of the FDA's Decision on Breast Im-
plants, 326 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1713, 1713-14 (1992) (discussing the basis for
the FDA's decision to limit access to silicone breast implants to those whose
need was greatest).
10. Nagareda, supra note 4, at 333-34.
11. Id. at 334 & n.199. The award included approximately $20 million in
punitive damages. Id. at 334 n.199.
12. See In re Silicone Gel Breast Implant Prods. Liab. Litig., No. CV94-P-
11558-S, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12521, at *1 (N.D. Ala. Sept. 1, 1994). Due to
insufficiencies in the settlement fund and a high number of individual plaintiff
opt-outs, the settlement subsequently unraveled, and Dow Corning ultimately
filed for bankruptcy in 1995. See Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in
Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEx. L. REV. 1, 21-22, 21 n.101 (1995) (reporting
that it would cost $7.3 billion to pay all claimants the proposed minimum pay-
out).
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clear. The first well-regarded epidemiological study was pub-
lished in June 1994." Conducted by the Mayo Clinic, it found
that implant recipients had no greater risk of connective tissue
disease. 4 Subsequent studies yielded similar results, 5 and in
April 1996, an exhaustive survey of the epidemiological litera-
ture definitively concluded that silicone implants presented no
large increase in the risk of developing connective tissue dis-
16
ease.
Other well-known mass tort litigations share striking simi-
larities. For example, Bendectin, an antinausea drug used to
treat morning sickness in pregnant women, was once suspected
of being a teratogen, or cause of birth defects. 7 When the first
lawsuit was brought in 1977, the scientific data on Bendectin
was likewise scant. The evidence consisted of some anecdotal
accounts, a few animal toxicology studies, and four rather in-
adequate epidemiological studies. 8 Yet, despite the lack of a
13. Sherine E. Gabriel et al., Risk of Connective-Tissue Diseases and Other
Disorders After Breast Implantation, 330 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1697 (1994). Al-
though the Mayo Clinic study appears to be regarded as the first reliable
study, see, e.g., Rebecca S. Dresser et al., Breast Implants Revisited: Beyond
Science on Trial, 1997 Wis. L. REV. 705, 712, other epidemiological studies
were previously published, but perhaps are discounted as having inadequate
sample sizes. See Barbara G. Silverman et al., Reported Complications of Sili-
cone Gel Breast Implants: An Epidemiologic Review, 124 ANNALS INTERNAL
MED. 744, 748-49 tbl.2 (1996) (surveying all epidemiological studies on sili-
cone breast implants and connective tissue disorders).
14. Gabriel et al., supra note 13, at 1700; see also ANGELL, supra note 3,
at 101.
15. See, e.g., Charles H. Hennekens et al., Self-Reported Breast Implants
and Connective-Tissue Diseases in Female Health Professionals, 275 JAMA
616 (1996) (excluding large risks of connective tissue disease following breast
implants).
16. Silverman et al., supra note 13, at 754-55; see also ANGELL, supra
note 3, at 27 ("[Nlone of the epidemiologic studies has been able to demon-
strate a clear link between breast implants and connective tissue disease or
suggestive symptoms."). Certainly, science's inability to find a link does not
mean that no such link exists, particularly given the extremely high standards
of proof science requires (i.e., a 95% confidence level). Nonetheless, it is safe to
say that the case against silicone dramatically changed between 1992 and
1996.
17. For two excellent accounts of the Bendectin litigation, see MICHAEL D.
GREEN, BENDECTIN AND BIRTH DEFECTS: THE CHALLENGES OF MASS TOXIC
SUBSTANCES LITIGATION (1996) and JOSEPH SANDERS, BENDECTIN ON TRIAL:
A STUDY OF MASS TORT LITIGATION (1998).
18. GREEN, supra note 17, at 103-06 (explaining the shortcomings of the
four epidemiological studies, which suffered from small sample size and lack of
specificity); SANDERS, supra note 17, at 66-67 tbl.1 (summarizing Bendectin
animal studies). Notably, the few epidemiological studies available showed
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well-developed body of evidence linking Bendectin to birth de-
fects, some early juries found for plaintiffs. 19 In May 1983, a
District of Columbia jury awarded one plaintiff $750,000.20
Unlike the silicone breast implant litigation, science
caught up with the courts in the case of Bendectin. Although
the litigation ultimately caused Merrell Dow to withdraw Ben-
dectin from the American market in 1983,21 a substantial body
of evidence that the drug was non-teratogenic quickly formed,22
including findings from the drug regulatory agencies of the
United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Switzerland, and
Germany. 3 By 1985, nearly all of the scientific evidence had
been gathered,24 with the major peer-reviewed epidemiological
that Bendectin was not a teratogen. GREEN, supra note 17, at 103-06. The se-
rious flaws and weaknesses in the studies, however, illustrate the considerable
uncertainty surrounding Bendectin. Professor Margaret Berger has suggested
that a manufacturer's failure to fully research the possible adverse effects of
its products should in and of itself constitute a tort. Margaret A. Berger,
Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of Justice and
Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2143-52 (1997) (recommending that
general causation principles be replaced by this alternative tort regime).
19. See SANDERS, supra note 17, at 92-93 tbl.6 (summarizing Bendectin
trial awards and ultimate dispositions).
20. Oxendine v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 506 A.2d 1100, 1103 (D.C.
1986); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 827 (D.C.
1994) (recounting the convoluted procedural history of the case).
21. PETER W. HUBER, GALILEO'S REVENGE: JUNK SCIENCE IN THE
COURTROOM 127 (1991) (noting that although Merrell Dow ultimately "won
pretty much everything," it "probably spent upward of $100 million for its vin-
dication").
22. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 314-15 (arguing that Bendectin was dis-
tinctive because by the mid-1980s, the scientific literature was "unusually
rich," consisting of "21 epidemiological studies that focused on Bendectin and
14 other studies that included Bendectin"); SANDERS, supra note 17, at 106
(noting that with time "the published epidemiological evidence on Bendectin
more than tripled in size, substantially improved in quality, and tended to ex-
onerate Bendectin as a teratogen").
23. Joseph Sanders, From Science to Evidence: The Testimony on Causa-
tion in the Bendectin Cases, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1, 8 n.23 (1993). This group was
later joined by the Canadian Ministry of Health and Welfare. Oxendine, 649
A.2d at 830 n.8. Bendectin continues to be used in Canada today to treat
morning sickness. Sanders, supra, at 10. Doxylamine succinate, the most sus-
pect ingredient in Bendectin, also continues to be used in the United States in
over-the-counter cold remedies and sleeping aids. Id.
24. See Sanders, supra note 23, at 9, 30 (suggesting that as of 1993, any
uncertainty regarding the teratogenic effects of Bendectin is irreducible given
the state of technology). For example, as Huber notes, in the eight years fol-
lowing the withdrawal of Bendectin, "the Centers for Disease Control in At-
lanta... found no significant change in the incidence of birth defects." HUBER,
supra note 21, at 127.
318
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studies "unanimously conclud[ing] that Bendectin does not
cause birth defects."25 The courts took note of this consensus,
and increasingly granted judgments in favor of Merrell Dow.26
The results, of course, could have easily been far worse. Had
the evidence developed more slowly, or courts been less willing
to reverse for insufficient evidence,27 many judgments would
have become final before a scientific consensus formed.
The problem illustrated by these two examples 28-namely,
the problem of changing scientific evidence-has arisen time
and time again over the past decades.29 Each case demonstrates
the legal system's difficulty in dealing with scientific uncer-
tainty. To be precise, at the onset one should distinguish be-
tween two types of scientific uncertainty: uncertainty regarding
specific causation and uncertainty regarding general causation.
The majority of scholarly attention has focused on the diffi-
culty of indeterminacy regarding specific causation. Traditional
tort law requires a discrete, individualized harm that is caus-
ally traceable to the defendant. 30 Toxic torts, however, often
25. Oxendine, 649 A.2d at 830 n.8. For a more comprehensive picture of
the scientific evidence surrounding Bendectin, see Sanders, supra note 23, at
18-27.
26. See, e.g., Richardson v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 649 F. Supp. 799
(D.D.C. 1986) (granting a judgment notwithstanding the verdict for Merrell in
the face of a jury award of $1.2 million). See generally SANDERS, supra note 17,
at 92-93 tbl.6 (summarizing trial and appellate outcomes of Bendectin litiga-
tion). Even the jury in a consolidated multidistrict litigation in Ohio returned
a verdict for the defendant. In re Richardson-Merrell, Inc. "Bendectin" Prods.
Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 1212 (S.D. Ohio 1985), affd, 857 F.2d 290 (6th Cir.
1988).
27. But see Debra Lyn Bassett, "I Lost at Trial-in the Court of Appeals!":
The Expanding Power of the Federal Appellate Courts to Reexamine Facts, 38
HOUS. L. REV. 1129, 1154-76 (2001) (decrying increased scrutiny of jury fact
finding by appellate courts).
28. While beyond the scope of this Article, the general prevalence of prod-
ucts involving women's reproductive health in mass tort litigation is worth
noting. See Joan E. Steinman, Women, Medical Care, and Mass Tort Litiga-
tion, 68 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 409, 409-14 (1992) (observing that "women seem to
be disproportionately affected by harmful drugs and medical devices," and
suspecting a different standard of care by manufacturers).
29. See, e.g., Arthur Allen, Shots in the Dark, WASH. POST MAG., Aug. 30,
1998, at 10, 13-15, 21, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
srv/national/longtermlsunmag/shots/shotl.htm (discussing the changing evi-
dence linking certain vaccines to childhood neurological disorders).
30. See, e.g., Joelle Anne Moreno, Beyond the Polemic Against Junk Sci-
ence: Navigating the Oceans that Divide Science and Law with Justice Breyer
at the Helm, 81 B.U. L. REV. 1033, 1063 n.172 (2001); Robert L. Rabin, Envi-
ronmental Liability and the Tort System, 24 HOuS. L. REV. 27, 33-36 (1987)
(separating traditional from multiparty and toxic tort cases).
2003] 319
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create problems for this traditional paradigm because doctors
have not yet reached the level of sophistication necessary to
understand the biological mechanism behind the plaintiffs
condition.3' The best that medicine can do is rely on statistics
and other proxies to determine whether a substance creates a
health risk.32 Commentators and some courts have therefore
advocated for a shift to risk-based harm.13 Under a risk-based
regime (presumably involving the use of class actions as well),
courts do not need to inquire into specific causation. Only the
statistical risks imposed by a substance are important. Once
these risks are calculated, liability funds can be established
and victims insured against their future risks of injury.
34
Uncertainty exists beyond the issue of specific causation,
however. It can surround the determination of general causa-
tion; in other words, there may be uncertainty in the calcula-
tion of the risk itself.5 Many toxic tort cases are brought when
a mature scientific record has not yet developed: The law wants
answers, but science is not ready. Given the nature of scien-
tific research, the prevalence of this timing problem is unsur-
31. See Berger, supra note 18, at 2123 (noting that for most mass tort
cases "the precipitating mechanism that explains the ... substances' effects is
unknown").
32. See Michael D. Green, Expert Witnesses and Sufficiency of Evidence in
Toxic Substances Litigation: The Legacy of Agent Orange and Bendectin Liti-
gation, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 643, 645 (1992) (noting that given present technol-
ogy "biological mechanisms of most diseases are understood marginally at
best"); see also Troyen A. Brennan, Causal Chains and Statistical Links: The
Role of Scientific Uncertainty in Hazardous-Substance Litigation, 73 CORNELL
L. REV. 469, 509 (1988) (discussing the use of "statistical models and mathe-
matical formulae" in assessing the potential carcinogenic nature of chemicals).
33. E.g., Herskovits v. Group Health Coop. of Puget Sound, 664 P.2d 474,
481 (Wash. 1983) (Pearson, J., concurring) (suggesting that the "injury" caused
by a doctor's negligent diagnosis could be defined as the decreased chance of
surviving cancer); David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure
Cases: A "Public Law" Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 851, 859
(1984).
34. See David Rosenberg, Individual Justice and Collectivizing Risk-
Based Claims in Mass-Exposure Cases, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 210, 245-48 (1996).
In his article, Rosenberg calls for mandatory collectivization in the adjudica-
tion and settling of risk-based claims. See generally id.
35. See Confronting the New Challenges of Scientific Evidence, 108 HARV.
L. REV. 1481, 1587-89 (1995) [hereinafter New Challenges] (defining this prob-
lem as a "Class II" scientific evidence problem, as opposed to a "Class I" prob-
lem, which occurs when jurors have difficulty understanding the scientific evi-
dence).
36. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 45-46 (describing the problem of liti-
gation brought before sufficient scientific data has been collected).
[Vol 88:315
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prising. Scientific studies, particularly epidemiological ones,
are expensive and time consuming; v usually few specific stud-
ies will be available prior to litigation .3 "There are thousands
upon thousands of synthetic agents being used in the United
States that might pose toxic risks, yet only a tiny fraction have
been the subject of any epidemiologic inquiry. "39 Litigation may
spur research, but those results will only appear in the future,
often after litigation has ended.4°
This Article addresses the problems surrounding changing
scientific evidence of general causation. Part I examines the
costs created by the legal system's current inability to handle
changing scientific evidence. Part I also suggests that the prob-
lem differs from the "usual" case in which courts get facts
wrong, and therefore that the legal system ought to view it dif-
ferently.
Part II observes that the changing scientific evidence prob-
lem is caused by the conflicting timelines of law and science.
More specifically, the law's emphasis on speedy dispute resolu-
tion and finality clashes with science's culture of incremental
study and constant reevaluation. Part II thus argues that any
solution must account for this time mismatch in order to be
successful.
Finally, Part III looks at possible solutions. It first notes
that a number of the more creative tort reform proposals, such
as those involving agencies, would eliminate the time mismatch
by removing courts from the decision-making process and re-
placing them with more flexible institutions. These proposals,
however, require fundamental changes to the structure of the
tort system and thus may prove too radical to obtain public ac-
ceptance. Responding to this concern, Part III then offers more
modest solutions that operate with minimal changes to the cur-
rent institutional structure. For example, courts could stay pro-
ceedings for a fixed period of time when additional confirma-
tory studies were anticipated. Alternatively, courts could
37. Green, supra note 32, at 680.
38. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 17 (observing that, generally speaking,
scientific research has barely begun at the start of litigation).
39. Green, supra note 32, at 680 (citing a 1982 survey determining that
"[almong seventy-five chemicals found to be carcinogens in animals, only thir-
teen had been the subject of epidemiologic study").
40. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 17 (suggesting that general scientific
acceptance of a conclusion will not occur during a lawsuit's lifetime); Na-
gareda, supra note 4, at 317.
2003]
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address changing scientific evidence after final judgment
through an expansion of postjudgment relief. Although both so-
lutions have drawbacks, they may represent the best balance
by which accuracy can be improved with minimal disruption to
existing institutions.
I. THE PROBLEM OF CHANGING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Whenever litigation occurs before the scientific community
has developed a substantial literature on the harmful effects of
a substance, there is a significant probability that fact finders
will reach ultimately inaccurate conclusions. But surely there
are many other instances in which courts "get things wrong."
For example, a jury may believe certain witnesses and not oth-
ers and determine that a defendant ran a red light and caused
an accident. Later, a videotape may surface showing precisely
the opposite: The plaintiff, not the defendant, was the one who
ran the light. Yet, special procedures are not developed to deal
with these cases. Trials are not delayed in the hope that a
videotape may surface; judgments are not reopened to revise
the record. The interests of swift dispute resolution and finality
trump the competing value of accuracy. Indeed, according to
traditional economic analysis, as long as error is unbiased-
that is, on average plaintiffs and defendants benefit equally
from errors-the optimal deterrence goals of the tort system
are unaffected. So why concern ourselves with the problem of
changing scientific evidence at all?
A. ERROR COSTS GENERALLY
Even if errors are unbiased,4 the legal system should
hardly treat them so blithely. Of course the judicial system jug-
gles various competing goals, but accuracy is arguably the
paramount goal, and few things (outside the criminal law)42
41. Part I.B argues that the errors revealed by changing scientific evi-
dence are biased and indeed favor plaintiffs.
42. For example, the public has grown increasingly distressed by the
scores of inmates (often death-row inmates) exonerated by newly analyzed
DNA evidence. E.g., Raymond Bonner, Death Row Inmate Is Freed After DNA
Test Clears Him, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 24, 2001, at All; Adam Liptak, DNA Will
Let a Montana Man Put Prison Behind Him, but Questions Linger, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 1, 2002, at A18 (reporting the exoneration of one defendant and
subsequent requests for an audit of the Montana state crime lab); Governor
George H. Ryan, Commutation Announcement at Northwestern University
School of Law (Jan. 11, 2003), at http://www.law.northwestern.edul
depts/communicate/newspages/spring03/ryanspeech.htm (issuing a blanket
[Vol 88:315
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undermine public confidence in the legal system like massive,
industry-bankrupting lawsuits that are later proven wrong by
science.43 Some error is perhaps inevitable and thus under-
standable, but frequent error only serves to solidify public sus-
picions that the legal system is broken and badly in need of re-
44pair.
From an economic standpoint, errors clearly impair the so-
cial insurance goal of tort law, as some plaintiffs will receive (or
not receive) awards based on erroneous factual determinations.
Moreover, when the stakes are high, errors cause widespread
social and economic harm. In the face of such high stakes, the
mere fact that error is unbiased provides little comfort to com-
panies who can potentially go bankrupt long before any future
cases can balance out earlier errors. The fear of future litiga-
tion will cause some manufacturers to exit the market and de-
ter others from entering it in the first place.
These market exits deprive consumers of useful goods and
services. In the 1980s, the vaccines for measles, mumps, and
rubella (MMR) and diphtheria, tetanus, and pertussis (DTP)
were suspected of causing a variety of childhood neurological
disorders. 5 Mounting lawsuits coupled with the unavailability
of affordable liability insurance caused childhood vaccine
manufacturers to exit the market.46 By 1986, only one private
commutation for death row prisoners in Illinois); see also CTR. ON WRONGFUL
CONVICTIONS, NORTHWESTERN UNIV. SCH. OF LAW, ILLINOIS DEATH PENALTY
EXONERATIONS, at http://www.law.northwestern.edu/depts/cliniclwrongfulV
deathpenalty.htm (last modified May 4, 2003) (reporting that since the death
penalty was restored in Illinois a quarter of a century ago, seventeen of the
298 individuals sentenced to death in Illinois have been exonerated-"a rate of
5.7%, the highest exoneration rate of the 38 states with death penalties on
their books").
43. See Peter H. Schuck, Multi-Culturalism Redux: Science, Law, and
Politics, 11 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 1, 22-23 (1993) (discussing how scientific
evidence that contradicted the legal results in the Bendectin litigation "con-
tributed to a more general discrediting of the tort system" because the litiga-
tion had driven the product off the market). Perhaps even more disconcerting
is the prospect that manufacturers would be erroneously immunized against
future lawsuits.
44. See id. at 22 (suggesting that "public attitudes, political discourse, and
scientific opinion can alter the level of legal error that society, and hence the
law, will accept").
45. E.g., Stephen Engelberg, Vaccine: Assessing Risks and Benefits, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 19, 1984, at C1 (summarizing studies showing adverse effects
from MMR and pertussis vaccines).
46. See STAFF OF THE SUBCOMM. ON HEALTH & THE ENV'T, COMM. ON
ENERGY & COMMERCE, 99TH CONG., 2D SESS., CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS
73-74, 85-89 (Comm. Print 1986) [hereinafter CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS];
2003] 323
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manufacturer of MMR and two of DTP remained.47 Facing a de-
stabilized vaccine market, a public health threat of vaccine
shortages, and an accompanying risk of disease outbreaks,
Congress ultimately established a federal no-fault compensa-
tion program under the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act
of 1986.48 Ironically, the whole vaccine crisis might have been
avoided. Later evidence questioned any causal link between the
vaccines and brain damage.4 9 In August 2001, the New England
Journal of Medicine published the largest study ever on the ad-
verse effects of DTP and MMR vaccinations." Its conclusion:
While the vaccines may elevate the risks of certain seizures,
"these risks do not appear to be associated with any long-term,
adverse consequences. "51
The problem of changing scientific evidence can also have
potentially distorting effects on the scientific process. Scientists
rely on publication and peer review to verify their findings and
communicate with their colleagues. Excessive zeal in trans-
forming preliminary discussion studies into bases for litigation
is likely to chill the free flow of information within the scientific
community, or at least alter it to the detriment of scientific
progress. As one coauthor of a (later refuted) 1981 study link-
ing spermicides to birth defects lamented, "[i]n our present liti-
gious environment, the reservations and qualifications written
into a published report are often ignored, and the article is used
Daniel A. Cantor, Striking a Balance Between Product Availability and Prod-
uct Safety: Lessons from the Vaccine Act, 44 AM. U. L. REV. 1853, 1858-60
(1995); see also CHILDHOOD IMMUNIZATIONS, supra, at 86 (reporting that vac-
cine manufacturers faced up to $3.5 billion in potential liability).
47. H.R. REP. No. 99-908, at 7 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6344, 6348.
48. Pub. L. No. 99-660, 100 Stat. 3755 (1986). For a broader discussion on
the operation of the federal Vaccine Injury Compensation Program, see Allen,
supra note 29, at 13-14, 22-23.
49. See Allen, supra note 29, at 14 (reporting that in the mid-1990s the
Department of Health and Human Services tightened compensation require-
ments based on its belief that "DPT is only rarely to blame for the brain dam-
age children have suffered after getting DPT shots," but also noting that a
1994 Institute of Medicine panel concluded that some causal relation existed).
50. William E. Barlow et al., The Risk of Seizures After Receipt of Whole-
Cell Pertussis or Measles, Mumps, and Rubella Vaccine, 345 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 656, 656 (2001).
51. Id. at 656; see also Kreesten Meldgaard Madsen et al., A Population-
Based Study of Measles, Mumps, and Rubella Vaccination and Autism, 347
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1477, 1477 (2002) (reporting "strong evidence against the
hypothesis that MMR vaccination causes autism" in a large Danish study).
[Vol 88:315
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as 'proof of a causal relationship."52 Consequently, he argued
that initial findings should be discussed only at scientific meet-
ings and publication delayed until "more information [is] avail-
able."53
B. BIASED ERROR
The errors revealed by changing scientific evidence are of
even greater concern because they are indeed biased. This
bias-as it turns out, bias in favor of plaintiffs-means that the
errors do not cancel out and optimal deterrence is not main-
tained. Instead, manufacturers are systematically overde-
terred, further exacerbating the harm to social welfare dis-
cussed above.
Traditionally, plaintiffs could bring suit only within a very
limited time frame set by statutes of limitations, which ran
from the "time of injury."54 During this window, plaintiffs had
to accept the scientific evidence as they found it, whether fa-
vorable or not. This regime had its obvious injustices, but the
error was presumably unbiased-sometimes, plaintiffs had fa-
vorable evidence that was later proven false; other times, de-
fendants did. The errors theoretically cancelled out in the long
55
run.
Toxic torts, however, are often difficult to detect at the
time of injury, and thus jurisdictions have increasingly adopted
the "discovery rule" in these types of cases.56 Under the discov-
ery rule, the limitations period does not begin to run until the
plaintiff "discovers" or reasonably should have discovered the
injury, and in many states, its cause.57 Practically speaking, the
52. Lewis B. Holmes, Letter to the Editor, Vaginal Spermicides and Con-
genital Disorders: The Validity of a Study, 256 JAMA 3096, 3096 (1986).
53. Id.
54. E.g., Thornton v. Roosevelt Hosp., 391 N.E.2d 1002, 1003 (N.Y. 1979)
(sustaining a date-of-injury rule).
55. One should note, however, that there was unbiased error only with
respect to changing scientific evidence, which assumes that at least some stud-
ies exist. The overall error was biased against plaintiffs. Since scientific
knowledge starts from a state of ignorance, oftentimes no studies exist-
neither for plaintiffs nor for defendants. And in the absence of evidence, de-
fendants always prevail.
56. E.g., In re N.Y. County DES Litig., 678 N.E.2d 474, 476-77 (N.Y.
1997) (discussing New York statute adopting a discovery rule); Sahlie v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 663 P.2d 473 (Wash. 1983) (en banc) (discussing
common law precedent adopting a discovery rule prior to enactment of a su-
perceding statute).
57. See generally 2 MARSHALL S. SHAPO, THE LAW OF PRODUCTS
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rule makes sense; without it, plaintiffs exposed to substances
initially thought to be harmless would rarely, if ever, be able to
58
recover.
By expanding the window during which plaintiffs can bring
suit, however, some variants of the discovery rule create an un-
intended effect. Permitting plaintiffs to forgo litigation until
they discover the cause of their injury increases the likelihood
that plaintiffs will bring litigation when (possibly changing) sci-
entific evidence is favorable to them. If early studies fail to
show any evidence of a causal link, plaintiffs will wait, because
they will be presumably unaware of the cause of their injury."
Once a study indicates a possible linkage, however, plaintiffs
can litigate immediately. In contrast, defendants, lacking the
practical means to obtain declaratory judgments against un-
known plaintiffs, are unable to exploit any early studies in
their favor. °
The only pressure possibly counteracting this plaintiff bias
appears to be the set of incentives governing plaintiffs' attor-
neys. By permitting the attorneys of early entrants to monopo-
lize enforcement,' class actions create strong incentives for at-
LIABILITY (4th ed. 2001), TT 30.05-.06 (discussing the discovery rule); Lisa K.
Mehs, Asbestos Litigation and Statutes of Repose: The Application of the Dis-
covery Rule in the Eighth Circuit Allows Plaintiffs to Breathe Easier, 24
CREIGHTON L. REV. 965, 973-84 (1991) (discussing variants of the discovery
rule used in asbestosis cases).
58. Condon v. A.H. Robins Co., 349 N.W.2d 622, 625 (Neb. 1984) (arguing
that "it would be a Hobson's choice" to suggest that a plaintiff must "show not
only a breach of duty but an injury or damage resulting from that breach,"
while also "suggest[ing] that the time for bringing that action could begin and
terminate before the individual could either reasonably be aware of the injury
or damage or be able in any manner to establish its existence"); 2 SHAPO, su-
pra note 57, T 30.05[2] [b].
59. Under what conditions plaintiffs may wait is ultimately a jury ques-
tion and depends on state law, but many courts have not started limitations
periods until a sizable body of evidence favorable to the plaintiff has devel-
oped. E.g., Hoerner v. Wesley-Jensen, Inc., 684 So. 2d 508, 514 (La. Ct. App.
1996) (holding that the limitations period did not begin until the plaintiff read
a medical journal study linking extended-wear contact lenses to eye infec-
tions); Graves v. Church & Dwight Co., 541 A.2d 725, 728-29 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1988) (tolling limitations period despite the existence of studies link-
ing baking soda to stomach ruptures because of uncertainty in the medical
community), affd by an equally divided court, 558 A.2d 463 (N.J. 1989).
60. Indeed, absent ongoing litigation, early studies in favor of defendants
(i.e., showing no causal link) are unlikely to be published at all since they do
not represent "interesting" findings. See infra note 95.
61. Courts review many factors when appointing class counsel, but in-
variably a major factor is "the work counsel has done in identifying or investi-
gating potential claims in the action." FED. R. Civ. P. 23(g)(l)(C)(i) (adopted by
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torneys to move quickly, even if the evidence is not as favorable
as desired.62 But even the most zealous plaintiff attorney will
begin costly proceedings only if the available evidence offers a
significant probability of success. This counterbalance is there-
fore unlikely to be sufficient to guarantee unbiased error.
C. IMPROVING EVIDENCE WITH TIME
Aside from the various concerns over errors and error
costs, one can analytically distinguish evidence of general cau-
sation from the evidence in a traditional tort case, possibly jus-
tifying different treatment. This is because evidence of general
causation improves with time, whereas evidence in a tradi-
tional tort case degrades. 63
In a traditional accident case, evidence is generated in a
single incident. 4 Thereafter, that evidence degrades: Witnesses
become unavailable or forgetful; physical evidence becomes lost
or less reliable.65 The only possibility of evidence improving is if
new technology later provides better tools for analysis, but by
definition such technology is currently unknown and the time
frame entirely unpredictable. Under these instances, statutes
of limitation sensibly induce parties to investigate and to liti-
gate the issues promptly,66 and doctrines such as res judicata
prevent later reexaminations based on stale evidence.
In contrast, evidence about general causation typically im-
proves over time. Improvement can occur in two ways. First,
the U.S. Supreme Court and transmitted to Congress on Mar. 27, 2003, H.R.
REP. No. 108-56, at 7, to be effective Dec. 1, 2003, absent Congressional ac-
tion).
62. See Peter A. Drucker, Class Certification and Mass Torts: Are "Imma-
ture" Tort Claims Appropriate for Class Action Treatment?, 29 SETON HALL L.
REV. 213, 221 n.33 (1998) (arguing that immature class actions, by litigating
claims before sufficient proof is available, disadvantage class members).
63. Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus: Factfinding at the
Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. REV. 521, 533 (1986) (distinguishing cases in
which the passage of time generates more evidence from cases based on past
events in which little evidence remains to be discovered).
64. See, e.g., D.H. Kaye, Proof in Law and Science, 32 JURIMETRICS J. 313,
317 (1992) (describing events in legal proceedings as "over and done with").
65. Cf Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc., 321 U.S.
342, 348-49 (1944) (noting that statutes of limitations are designed to prevent
stale claims in which "evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and wit-
nesses have disappeared").
66. Cf. Michael D. Green, The Paradox of Statutes of Limitations in Toxic
Substances Litigation, 76 CAL. L. REV. 965 (1988) (discussing the problem of
statutes of limitations creating premature mass tort actions).
67. One should note that toxic tort cases often involve issues of both gen-
2003]
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the data available for studies on general causation improves
over time. Whether a substance like silicone causes a harmful
effect is a universally applicable question; it is not confined to a
particular case. 68 Thus, if some population continues to con-
sume a drug or to be exposed to a suspected toxin, time will
generate more physical data. Even if no one is further exposed,
to the extent that some diseases involve long latency periods,
the data will also improve with time.
Second, even if the amount of available data (i.e., the num-
ber of people exposed to the substance) remains constant, the
studies that collect and analyze the data improve over time. Al-
though large epidemiological studies are generally thought to
69be the most reliable evidence of general causation, t
unfortunately also the most expensive and time consuming be-
cause they involve collecting information from large numbers of
people. Early studies thus typically use smaller sample sizes or
less costly techniques and depend on later confirmatory studies
to verify their results."
The above analysis suggests that it is not necessary for the
law to treat all errors alike. Errors regarding general causation
eral causation and specific causation. Proving specific causation often involves
facts such as whether and when the plaintiff was actually exposed to a sub-
stance and at what dosage. These types of facts, however, generally degrade
with time, being similar to those found in traditional accident cases. See infra
Part III.C.3.
68. In this way, one can consider general causation to be a legislative fact
in the dichotomy famously drawn by Kenneth Culp Davis. See Kenneth Culp
Davis, An Approach to Problems of Evidence in the Administrative Process, 55
HARv. L. REV. 364, 402-10 (1942). Professor Davis's original distinction de-
fined legislative facts as those facts that form the basis for law and policy, as
opposed to those facts that concerned only the parties in a particular case. Id.
at 402. The legislative fact designation, however, can be applied more broadly;
it can be applied to all facts that are "general" in character and applicable to a
large class of persons.
69. Cf. id. at 530 (drawing a distinction between clinical and statistical
proof, and suggesting that facts such as general causation are best determined
via carefully controlled scientific studies that use statistics, rather than the
clinical judgment of any single practitioner); William Meadow & Cass R. Sun-
stein, Statistics, Not Experts, 51 DUKE L.J. 629, 631, 641 (2001) (proposing
that the legal system should rely on statistical data, rather than expert opin-
ions, to mitigate personal bias in judgments about risk).
70. See Michael B. Bracken, Spermicidal Contraceptives and Poor
Reproductive Outcomes: The Epidemiologic Evidence Against an Association,
151 AM. J. OBSTETRICS & GYNECOLOGY 552, 555 (1985).
328 [Vol 88:315
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may carry significant economic and legitimacy costs, distort the
scientific process, and result in overdeterrence. In addition, the
usual concerns about stale or degraded evidence are far less sa-
lient in the context of general causation. Thus, while values
such as speedy dispute resolution and finality remain impor-
tant, they are less important with respect to general causation
and may need to yield to accuracy concerns in certain situa-
tions. The remainder of the Article offers suggestions on how
the legal system might minimize errors caused by changing sci-
entific evidence.
II. TIMELINES: HOW TO VIEW THE PROBLEM
OF CHANGING SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE
Finding a solution to the problem of changing scientific
evidence requires an understanding of the timelines of both le-
gal and scientific inquiry. Law and science have fundamentally
different philosophies and purposes:" Law values speedy reso-
lution and finality in addition to accuracy; science focuses pri-
marily on accuracy alone. Courts and scientists therefore have
different timelines for resolving disputes and controversies, and
the resulting tension creates the changing scientific evidence
problem.
A. LAW VERSUS SCIENCE
The timeline for legal inquiry is brief. Because of the press-
ing need for dispute resolution, the legal system typically lacks
the patience for prolonged research or further inquiry.72 Al-
though litigation inevitably experiences delays, courts do not
otherwise purposefully delay decision.73 With two litigants and
71. E.g., Mercado v. Ahmed, 756 F. Supp. 1097, 1100 (N.D. Ill. 1991);
Susan E. Cowell, Note, Pretrial Mediation of Complex Scientific Cases: A Pro-
posal to Reduce Jury and Judicial Confusion, 75 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 981, 983-
98 (2000) (discussing the tension between science and the law).
72. E.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir. 1986)
("[Piroducts liability law does not preclude recovery... until science has had
the time and resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the
chemical." (quoting Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1536 (D.C.
Cir. 1984))); see also SHEILA JASANOFF, SCIENCE AT THE BAR 9-10 (1995) (not-
ing that because the legal system seeks closure, it cannot postpone a decision
until more evidence arises).
73. See Mercado, 756 F. Supp. at 1100 ("Courts are not to be deterred
from making a decision because the matter is beset with doubt."); Nagareda,
supra note 4, at 316 (observing that although litigation is subject to various
and considerable delays, "unlike political bodies, it generally cannot refuse to
decide").
2003] 329
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a dispute to settle, courts take the case and make the best deci-
sion out of whatever evidence is presented.74 As Professors Hart
and McNaughton once aptly noted:
The law does not require absolute assurance of the perfect correctness
of particular decisions. While it is of course important that the court
be right in its determinations of fact, it is important that the court de-
cide the case when the parties ask for the decision and on the basis of
the evidence presented by the parties. A decision must be made now,
one way or the other. To require certainty or even near-certainty in
such a context would be impracticable and undesirable. The law thus
compromises."
Moreover, legal decisions are considered final and are not
76open for reexamination. Doctrines such as res judicata give
great weight to the value of finality, even in instances when de-
fending finality sacrifices accuracy.77 As discussed in Part III.D,
res judicata has few exceptions, reflecting the policy that "there
be an end of litigation" and that there be "private peace."8 The
rhetoric surrounding legal decision making reinforces this aura
of finality by denying any uncertainty. Juries decide facts in de-
finitive "yes or no" fashion without any expression of their level
of confidence. 79 Thus, although legal decisions are made ex-
74. See Green, supra note 32, at 696-97 ("The luxury of reserving judg-
ment and advocating further investigation to resolve an uncertainty is not one
available to the legal system. Courts must resolve disputes and resolve them
based on their best estimate of the truth, regardless of how much uncertainty
infects that assessment." (citations omitted)).
75. Henry M. Hart & John T. McNaughton, Evidence and Inference in the
Law, DAEDALUS, Fall 1958, at 40, 45.
76. See New Challenges, supra note 35, at 1484 (defining the purpose of
the legal system as achieving the "authoritative, final, just, and socially ac-
ceptable resolution of disputes").
77. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 831 (D.C.
1994) (holding that the outcome of a case "must turn upon the teaching of sci-
ence as understood at the time of trial as best can be discerned through the
presentations of the parties," and that "[tlo reopen the trial's determination of
scientific truth... runs squarely into the fundamental principle of certainty");
cf. Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406 (1932) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting) (suggesting that stare decisis reflects a policy judgment that "in
most matters it is more important that the applicable rule of law be settled
than that it be settled right").
78. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981).
79. Cf Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and
the Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1382-84 (1985) (explain-
ing how "proportionate awards," awards that would be based on the probabil-
ity that the defendant caused the harm, may undermine attempts to shape
behavior). Analogously, judges traditionally deny any uncertainty in law, often
interpreting laws under the fiction that indeterminacy never existed. See Rad-
bruch, Introduction to Legal Study, in THE LEGAL PROCESS 1407, 1408-09
(Henry M. Hart & Albert M. Sacks eds., 1958) (excerpt from the chapter on
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tremely quickly and sometimes with few assurances of reliabil-
ity, they are ironically accepted as conclusive.8
In stark contrast, science has a "relatively open-ended"
time frame.8 With its focus primarily on accuracy, scientific in-
quiry proceeds in a progressive, incremental fashion. Contro-
versies are resolved not through speedy formal proceedings, but
through the time-consuming process of consensus building. 82 Of
course, external factors, such as a potentially grave public
health crisis, can accelerate scientific investigation by provid-
ing more resources or by creating a sense of urgency.83 But for
the most part, the process of fact finding is slow and deliber-
ate. 4
By the same token, finality is not a value revered or even
appreciated in the scientific community. "The very nature of
science incorporates a view of even generally accepted explana-
tions of phenomena as tentative truths, not settled certain-
ties."85 Being descriptive and empirical,86 the scientific method
relies on testable and falsifiable hypotheses 87-nothing is ever
Judicial Organization) (quoting the French Civil Code of 1804: "A judge who
refuses to enter judgment on the pretext of the silence, obscurity or inade-
quacy of the statute is subject to prosecution for a denial of justice."). Some re-
cent doctrines, however, do acknowledge the possibility of ambiguities in the
law. See, e.g., Teague v. Lane, 489 U.S. 288, 299-301 (1989) (addressing the
question of retroactivity under habeas corpus review in a case applying "new
law" under the Constitution); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat'l Res. Def. Council,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984) (establishing the first stage of the Chevron
test for agency deference, which asks whether a statute is "ambiguous"); Har-
low v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (developing the qualified immunity
doctrine under § 1983, which immunizes government officials unless their ac-
tions were in violation of "clearly established" law).
80. Schuck, supra note 43, at 25.
81. Id. at 17.
82. See generally Ernan McMullin, Scientific Controversy and Its Termi-
nation, in SCIENTIFIC CONTROVERSIES 49 (H. Tristram Engelhardt, Jr. & Ar-
thur L. Caplan eds., 1987) (discussing the ways in which scientific controver-
sies are resolved).
83. Dresser et al., supra note 13, at 743-45 (suggesting that litigation
sparked scientific study in both Bendectin and silicone breast implants).
84. See Berger, supra note 18, at 2119 (noting the considerable time nec-
essary before the scientific community even reaches a temporary consensus on
causation issues); Feldman, supra note 12, at 17 n.79 (describing the slow pro-
gress of science in determining harmful substances in the face of latency peri-
ods and the absence of signature diseases); Sanders, supra note 23, at 23 (re-
porting that over time the research methodology in Bendectin improved and
the scientific certainty of the research increased).
85. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 830 (D.C. 1994).
86. See New Challenges, supra note 35, at 1484.
87. See KARL R. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 40-41
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final; nothing ever certain.88 Every theory is provisional, be-
cause it can be proven false by "even a single observation that
disagrees with [its] predictions."8 9
So what happens when law and its short timeline attempts
to draw evidence from science and its long (and potentially in-
definite) timeline? Inevitably, the legal system will on occasion
make decisions based on bodies of scientific knowledge that are
in their infancy.9" And as science makes new findings and dis-
covers new evidence, those decisions may be called into ques-
tion. In short, the legal system ends up with the problem of
changing scientific evidence.
The natural solution is to match the timelines of law and
science. Unfortunately, the purposes and traditions of courts
are so different from those of scientists that complete timeline
congruence is essentially impossible. Litigation cannot drag on
indefinitely waiting for the possibility of scientific progress.9' At
the same time, science cannot artificially cease its processes of
• • 92
reexamination. The unavailability of perfect congruence, how-
(1959) (discussing the now-famous "falsifiability" characteristic of scientific
investigation); see also Stephen Jay Gould, Adam's Navel, in EYEWITNESS TO
SCIENCE 95, 95-105 (John Carey ed., 1995) (discussing the importance of falsi-
fiability in science).
88. See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S. 579, 589-90 (1993)
(observing that "arguably, there are no certainties in science"); Feldman, su-
pra note 12, at 16 (characterizing the dynamic view of science as the "central
lesson of the switch from logical to revised empiricism" and acknowledging
that revision is always an option because new data changes collective judg-
ments and replaces previously held theories).
89. STEPHEN HAWKING, THE ILLUSTRATED A BRIEF HISTORY OF TIME 15-
17 (1996); see also Editorial, In Science We Trust, SCI. AM., Dec. 2002, at 14
("The greatest mistake is to wait for 100 percent scientific certainty or agree-
ment, because it will never materialize."). As David Hume noted, because
what one sees as "cause-and-effect" is determined only by a series of observa-
tions, one never knows whether that previous pattern of observations was
purely coincidental (and hence the attribution of "causal" was entirely false).
DAVID HUME, AN ENQUIRY CONCERNING HUMAN UNDERSTANDING 109-18
(Oxford Univ. Press 1999) (1748).
90. See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97 ("[Tlhere are important differences
between the quest for truth in the courtroom and the quest for truth in the
laboratory. Scientific conclusions are subject to perpetual revision. Law, on the
other hand, must resolve disputes finally and quickly.").
91. See People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 721 n.15 (Cal. 1984)
("[A]ppellate judges do not have the luxury of waiting until their colleagues in
the sciences unanimously agree that on a particular issue no more research is
necessary. Given the nature of the scientific endeavor, that day may never
come.").
92. See, e.g., McMullin, supra note 82, at 80-81 (discussing the failure of
agronomist T.D. Lysenko under the Soviet regime to overthrow "Morganist"
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ever, clearly does not preclude striving for better congruence.
B. SCIENTIFIC MATURITY
Given the legal system's inability to wait forever and liti-
gation's need for a finite time frame, is there some time frame
that is better than the others? As it turns out, a reasonable
compromise between the legal and scientific timelines can be
achieved by focusing on the maturity of scientific evidence.
From a scientific perspective, the idea of "maturity" may seem
a contradiction in terms since science never truly views any-
thing as certain or final. But from a practical or legal perspec-
tive, scientific maturity can prove extremely useful by suggest-
ing how the legal system might better accommodate the
scientific process.
Anyone rethinking the timeline for legal inquiry must bal-
ance error costs and waiting costs.93 Error costs are the costs of
inaccurate decisions; waiting costs are the costs attributable to
unresolved disputes, uncompensated plaintiffs, and financially
unstable defendants. In a traditional tort case, since evidence
degrades with time,94 delay creates both error costs and waiting
costs. Courts therefore understandably concentrate on shorten-
ing the timeline. In proceedings involving general causation,
however, delay creates waiting costs, but the delay also reduces
error costs. The legal system, however, cannot delay forever,
and so the question becomes: When does delay yield diminish-
ing returns? The answer lies in the idea of scientific maturity.
Given limited research funds, scientists are reluctant to
squander their time and resources on studies that merely verify
conventional wisdom and/or the harmlessness of a substance.99
Consequently, early studies often sacrifice reliability for af-
genetics and to impose a brand of Lamarckian evolution by decree).
93. Science, of course, has few waiting costs, and thus has the luxury of
focusing exclusively on minimizing error. See KENNETH R. FOSTER & PETER
W. HUBER, JUDGING SCIENCE: SCIENTIFIC KNOWLEDGE AND THE FEDERAL
CouRTs 17 (1999).
94. See supra Part I.C.
95. See GREEN, supra note 17, at 315 (observing that "researchers do not
explore, agencies do not fund grants, and journals do not publish studies about
agents that result in negative findings"); Bracken, supra note 70, at 555 ("In-
vestigators are more likely to write up positive findings, reviewers to consider
them of interest, editors to publish them, and the press to publicize them.").
Professor Green further notes that Bendectin is rather unusual because of the
rich literature showing an absence of harmful effects. GREEN, supra note 17,
at 315.
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fordability by using smaller sample sizes or less costly tech-
niques.96 These preliminary studies point to promising avenues
of research that are then more thoroughly researched using
larger, more expensive avenues.
Research into toxic substances, therefore, experiences
somewhat of a life cycle. Early on, there is a period of rapid pro-
gression in which the scientific community moves from near to-
tal ignorance to being reasonably well informed. Sometimes the
period may end with a dominant, generally accepted "answer";
sometimes it may not-for example, in many scientific debates
there are still two opposing camps.97 Suffice it to say, however,
at the end of this period, science has developed a stable and
mature body of knowledge that is suitable for reasoned decision
making.98 Of course, whatever equilibrium is reached at the end
of the life cycle may be disturbed in the future because science
is a process of continual reexamination. For example, new
technology or a new scientific theory may alter the perspective
science has on an issue. Such developments are entirely
unpredictable, however.'00 In contrast, the life cycle likely is
predictable.
Accordingly, if the legal system could account for the scien-
tific life cycle, it could significantly ameliorate the problem of
changing scientific evidence while keeping waiting costs man-
ageable. Delaying judgment in anticipation of a definite im-
provement in evidence seems prudent; delaying in anticipation
96. See Bracken, supra note 95, at 555 (observing that "initial reports...
are... often based on secondary analyses of existing data, and specifically de-
signed studies come later").
97. See Feldman, supra note 12, at 17 (suggesting that general scientific
acceptance of a conclusion will not occur during a litigation's lifetime).
98. Of course, maturity does not mean that science has finished or has ar-
rived at some objective truth. One can nonetheless still have some confidence
that, regardless of the distortions caused by social forces, the scientific method
fundamentally generates useful information. See Joseph Sanders et al., Legal
Perceptions of Science and Expert Knowledge, 8 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL'Y & L.
139, 147-51 (2002) (describing a "realist-constructivist view of science" in that
.science is socially constructed both in the laboratory and in the wider com-
munity, but the construction is constrained by input from the empirical
world").
99. Cf. Stuart Minor Benjamin, Stepping into the Same River Twice: Rap-
idly Changing Facts and the Appellate Process, 78 TEx. L. REV. 269 (1999)
(discussing, in the context of changing facts and appellate review, the possibil-
ity that facts will never settle down).
100. Cf. supra Part I.C (discussing that evidence may improve if technology
provides better tools for analysis, but those developments are unknown and
unpredictable).
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of unknown improvements does not.
III. SOLUTIONS
How can the legal system better account for the scientific
life cycle and thereby mitigate the problem of changing scien-
tific evidence? This Part runs through a variety of solutions,
from radical tort reform to imposing more stringent evidentiary
requirements. In the end, however, it settles on two proposals
to help the timeline of law more closely match the timeline of
science. The first would create a limited delay mechanism be-
fore trial to provide scientists with additional time to investi-
gate the issues. The second would create a limited contingency
period after final judgment during which courts could reexam-
ine verdicts.
A. RADICAL TORT REFORM
A number of scholars have argued that the current tort
system is broken beyond repair, and have therefore proposed
radical tort reforms. For example, many have suggested that
agencies, not courts, should handle toxic torts. °10 This approach
is motivated by a view that risks are more appropriately ad-
dressed through public regulation and administration, rather
than private litigation. 2
An outright transfer to administrative agencies would
readily eliminate any short-term problem of changing scientific
evidence. Lacking the financial incentives of plaintiffs, agencies
101. See, e.g., W. KIP Viscusi, REFORMING PRODUCTS LIABILITY 171-72
(1991) (suggesting an administrative alternative to the current system); Bren-
nan, supra note 32, at 523-32 (developing a comprehensive agency approach
to mass tort litigation with scientific, enforcement, and compensation panels);
Nagareda, supra note 4, at 340, 349 (arguing that risks should be dealt with
administratively, not through the tort system, and that administrative law
and mass torts scholars need to establish a dialogue). But see CHARLES FRIED
& DAVID ROSENBERG, MAKING TORT LAW: WHAT SHOULD BE DONE AND WHO
SHOULD Do IT 79 (2003) (suggesting that the tort system and the administra-
tive agencies need to work together "to achieve optimal precautions").
102. Various aspects of mass tort litigation, such as administering a set-
tlement or recovery fund, or determining subcategories for compensation, are
familiar agency responsibilities. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action
and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of Mass Tort Reform, 73 VA. L.
REV. 845, 885-86 (1987) (discussing the use of settlement funds and their
similarity to administrative proceedings); Nagareda, supra note 4, at 314-15
(same). See generally Richard A. Nagareda, Turning from Tort to Administra-
tion, 94 MICH. L. REV. 899 (1996) (describing the similarities between the re-
cent rise of class settlements and the historic rise of administrative agencies).
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would be unlikely to pursue enforcement actions in the absence
of a mature body of scientific evidence. Agencies would not even
have to worry about defendant insolvency, since they could con-
ceivably require the maintenance of insurance funds to protect
against unknown future harms.
The use of agencies would have further incidental benefits.
During the period of scientific immaturity, agencies could fund
scientific studies independently, lessening any reliance on the
parties or independent scientific interest. Once a mature body
of science became available, agencies would have a significant
comparative advantage over courts in assessing the evidence,
as they presumably have far greater expertise in their respec-
tive fields. °3
Despite inherent advantages in flexibility and expertise,
agency solutions suffer several drawbacks, including the well-
known problem of agency capture.' The same discretion that
empowers agencies to determine when to initiate enforcement
actions also enables agencies to choose not to initiate enforce-
ment actions at all. It is exceedingly difficult for victims to
compel an agency to initiate enforcement. 10 5 Thus, if an agency
becomes captured by an industry, victims may have few alter-
ative options for recourse. Whatever its shortcomings, the tort
system often serves as a check on agency capture, 10 6 and thus
reforms to the system require cautious allocations of power to
agencies.
103. The idea of using agencies to resolve ex post tort disputes might lead
to questioning why agencies like the FDA do not simply require more strin-
gent testing before granting approval. Practically speaking, however, clinical
trials must be of a limited size and consequently have limited statistical
power. Greater sample sizes and statistically powerful studies are available
only after products become widely available.
104. See generally David B. Spence & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case
for the Administrative State, 89 GEO. L.J. 97, 105 n.37 (2000) (summarizing
two types of capture theory, one created when actual "subgovernments" form,
and the other created when the general public "loses interest in agency poli-
cymaking, leaving only regulated interest groups to participate in the proc-
ess"). For sources on agency capture, see id.
105. See, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985) (recognizing
that an agency's discretion to initiate or not to initiate an enforcement action
is generally nonreviewable).
106. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 80-81 (suggesting that
"tort suits sound[] warnings that alertl and activate[] legislatures and agen-
cies to take needed regulatory action"). Agencies are not only subject to cap-
ture by special interest, but also subject to political pressures. See Nagareda,
supra note 4, at 365 (expressing the concern for agency bias created by elec-
toral concerns).
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Even if agencies are not "captured," they may still have
suboptimal incentives. Agencies have limited resources and
cannot research and pursue enforcement against every manu-
facturer and every hazardous product. Additionally, without fi-
nancial motive, agencies have fewer incentives than private
parties to research and litigate cases.' 7 Furthermore, the ex-
pertise of agencies may lie more in their ability to make policy-
oriented cost-benefit analyses than in their ability to make
strictly scientific determinations about causation. For example,
in withdrawing approval of a suspect drug, the FDA can con-
sider whether effective alternatives exist on the market. 1°8 This
type of inquiry is quite different from the causation determina-
tions made in torts.109
Finally, the most serious concern regarding radical reform
proposals such as agency administration is that they are radi-
cal. Wholesale restructurings of the tort system involve sub-
stantial risks and disruptions to traditional practices. Re-
placement of the tort system with an agency-based system will
remove the role of the private litigant and possibly the jury
from the tort system,1 and will also likely involve expansions
in bureaucracy. Even the most open-minded of reformists may
balk at such fundamental changes. Thus, even if radical reform
may be near optimal from a theoretical standpoint, it may not
be feasible from a practical standpoint.
107. On one hand, this situation may be socially beneficial because agen-
cies will conduct research or enforce claims only after weighing the costs and
benefits. On the other hand, agencies may be systematically underfunded by
unsympathetic legislatures.
108. See, e.g., Denise Grady, FDA Withdraws Drug for Diabetics, Citing
Health Risks, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 22, 2000, at Al (reporting that the FDA kept
Rezulin, a drug for diabetics, on the market despite certain health risks until
safer substitutes became available).
109. See Margaret A. Berger, The Supreme Court's Trilogy on the Admissi-
bility of Expert Testimony, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 9,
32-33 (2d ed. 2000) (discussing how risk assessment, often based on cost-
benefit analyses, is a different inquiry than causation). One can certainly
imagine a tort system that focused more on costs and benefits than causation,
but that would be a dramatic reform itself. See, e.g., Nagareda, supra note 4,
at 342 & n.239 (arguing that when risk levels are entirely unknown, political
institutions need to evaluate the risk and its associated level of uncertainty
against the potential benefits of the activity); Schuck, supra note 43, at 12
(suggesting that when neither scientists nor lawyers can provide answers,
politicians can fill the void).
110. See Schuck, supra note 43, at 42 ("Attempts to transform the trier-of-
fact are likely to be political non-starters. This is especially true of efforts to
alter the jury, one of our legal system's sacred cows, in the name of expertise,
one of our political system's bete-noirs.").
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Having made this concession to the grander reforms, this
Article now turns to smaller reforms that might achieve similar
improvements but will involve much lower degrees of disrup-
tion and public anxiety.
B. DISMISSAL
One crude method to ensure scientific maturity before liti-
gation is to exclude early scientific studies as unreliable and
consequently dismiss claims based on immature evidence. Ini-
tially, this mechanism may disadvantage some individual
plaintiffs since their claims will be dismissed and forever
barred. One would expect, however, that plaintiffs' attorneys
would rapidly learn the level of maturity required by courts
(e.g., the number of studies, sample sizes, etc.) and would adapt
accordingly to avoid future dismissals.
Recent developments in scientific evidence doctrine can be
interpreted to fall along these lines. Although controversial,
some courts have used a bright-line test requiring plaintiffs to
provide epidemiological evidence of general causation to escape
summary judgment."' These courts typically implement the
epidemiology requirement as a corollary to the reliability re-
quirements established in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceu-
ticals, Inc."12 Toxicology is viewed with suspicion because it in-
volves extrapolating from animals or isolated tissues to human
beings. 113 If a plaintiff presents only toxicological evidence,
111. See, e.g., Porter v. Whitehall Labs., Inc., 9 F.3d 607, 612, 614-16 (7th
Cir. 1993) (renal failure and ibuprofen); Brock v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc.,
874 F.2d 307, 313 (5th Cir. 1989), modified, 884 F.2d 166, 167 (5th Cir. 1989)
(Bendectin). In contrast, other courts have not required epidemiological evi-
dence. See, e.g., Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 788 F.2d 741, 745 (11th Cir.
1986); Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529, 1535 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
Other courts have permitted the use of toxicological evidence when epidemiol-
ogical evidence was unavailable. See, e.g., Benedi v. McNeil-P.P.C. Inc., 66
F.3d 1378, 1384-85 (4th Cir. 1995); Bloomquist v. Wapello County, 500
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Iowa 1993) (suggesting that to require epidemiological studies
would "automatically deny recovery to all claimants who are injured by a toxic
substance that is relatively new and as to which a statistical track record has
not yet been fully established"). See generally 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL.,
MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
134-38 (2002) (discussing the absence of epidemiological data in the aforemen-
tioned cases, among others).
112. See FED. R. EVID. 702; Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc., 509 U.S.
579, 593-96 (1993).
113. See Bernard D. Goldstein & Mary Sue Henifin, Reference Guide on
Toxicology, in REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 401, 413-15 (2d
ed. 2000). Interestingly, "[aill known human carcinogens cause cancer in an
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which is then excluded, the claim can be dismissed for insuffi-
ciency of evidence.
If epidemiological studies take more time and occur later in
the scientific life cycle, the effect of the epidemiology require-
ment is to delay litigation until the scientific literature is more
mature. This requirement has some hefty problems, however,
the most significant of which involves research incentives. To
the extent that plaintiffs lack resources (or plaintiffs' attorneys
lack financial incentives).1 . to conduct or fund large-scale epi-
demiological studies, the effective delay period may become in-
definite."' After all, if plaintiffs cannot recover without epide-
miological studies, why would defendant manufacturers ever
conduct or fund them? At best, such studies would affirmatively
exonerate the defendant-a result unnecessary for litigation
success. At worst, manufacturers would be aiding in their own
demise.
Furthermore, from an epistemological standpoint, why
should courts completely exclude toxicological evidence? 6 Toxi-
cology has well-accepted methods that are commonly used by
researchers and relied upon by medical professionals.1 7 The
studies are certainly probative in determining general causa-
tion, and their exclusion may have distorting effects. This is es-
pecially true because toxicology can sometimes remedy statisti-
cal weaknesses faced by epidemiological studies,"8 or predict
experimental animal, and no known animal carcinogen is known to be noncar-
cinogenic in humans." Ellen K. Silbergeld, The Role of Toxicology in Causa-
tion: A Scientific Perspective, 1 CTS. HEALTH SCI. & L. 374, 376 (1991). But see
Goldstein & Henifin, supra, at 414 (suggesting that arsenic is carcinogenic in
humans but not in animals, and that the epidemiological data for over 100
known animal carcinogens is inconclusive in humans).
114. Naturally, victims often lack financial resources to conduct large-scale
scientific studies. However, to the extent that they can aggregate individual
claims and exploit the resulting economies of scale, plaintiffs' attorneys have
significant incentives to sponsor research, though those incentives are only a
fraction (i.e., the contingency fee percentage) of defendant incentives. FRIED &
ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 88-92 (advocating for monopoly control over
mass tort litigation to create proper research incentives).
115. See Berger, supra note 18, at 2135-40, 2137 n.93 (discussing manufac-
turers' lack of short-term incentives to conduct research while allowing later
company management to take the blame).
116. See Silbergeld, supra note 113, at 378-79 (criticizing courts for exclud-
ing toxicology wholesale).
117. See id. at 375-78. See generally Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 113,
at 403-15 (discussing the principles of toxicology, the techniques used, and its
various applications).
118. See Michael D. Green et al., Reference Guide on Epidemiology, in
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small risks that would otherwise be invisible."1 9 The debate over
the relative merits of toxicology and epidemiology is a complex
one beyond the scope of the inquiry here, but suffice it to say,
excluding toxicology in the hope of encouraging litigation based
on mature scientific evidence may be too high a cost to pay.
Dismissal and the epidemiology requirement thus provide
a rather blunt instrument for adjusting the legal timeline and
solving the changing scientific evidence problem. After all, the
primary stated motivation behind the epidemiology require-
ment focuses on the reliability of particular types of scientific
methodologies, not timing. The delay is merely an incidental
benefit. The next subsection therefore attempts a more direct
approach.
C. DELAY
If delay is what ensures scientific maturity, then why not
impose delay directly? In the face of a few spotty studies, courts
could stay proceedings until the body of scientific evidence be-
came more substantial and stable.
1. Operational Details
How might such a stay mechanism be implemented? A
possible scenario might fall along these lines: Legal proceedings
would follow the traditional path, including the filing of plead-
ings and discovery. Then, either party could move for a stay for
scientific maturity. The court would review the scientific evi-
dence proffered, and if it was deemed immature, would grant a
stay for a fixed period of time. The range of permissible delay
periods could be set by statute or procedural rule. Upon the ex-
piration of the delay period, the proceedings would continue as
before, except that the previously "immature" scientific evi-
dence would now be admissible.
A few features of the stay mechanism deserve further
comment. First, the stay period is fixed in order to stimulate
scientific research. If the stay period were dependent on the fu-
ture state of scientific evidence, it would once again run the
risk of becoming indefinite. The scenario would be extremely
REFERENCE MANUAL ON SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE 333, 345-47 (2d ed. 2000)
(suggesting that toxicological methods can minimize the confounder problem
often encountered in epidemiological studies).
119. See Goldstein & Henifin, supra note 113, at 409 (discussing that
toxicology's extrapolation from high doses to low doses improves statistical
power).
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similar to the one under the dismissal mechanism: The defen-
dant would stay the proceedings, citing a lack of scientific ma-
turity; little research would be conducted because plaintiffs
lacked resources and defendants lacked incentives (indeed, had
perverse incentives); and the science would remain immature.
With a fixed, nonextendable stay period, the party moving for
the stay would have every incentive to act quickly. Procrastina-
tion would only yield future adverse judgments. Independent
research efforts in the scientific community, should they exist,
would also likely be spurred into action given the impending
deadline that would imbue any results with immediate, real-
world consequences.
Second, the applicable statute or procedural rule could set
the range of permissible delay lengths using empirical studies
of the scientific life cycle. As previously discussed, the problem
of changing scientific evidence results from a mismatch be-
tween the legal and scientific timelines."2 ° While exceptional
circumstances may require a more individualized analysis, for
the most part, the time needed to perform high-quality, large-
sample studies on a substance should fall within a commonly
observed range. The length therefore need not be entirely at
the court's discretion, and rule makers should definitely take
advantage of the knowledge developed in the empirical studies.
Third, the stay mechanism would occur after the initial
pleadings and discovery. The most obvious benefit of this tim-
ing is to ensure that courts will have sufficient information to
determine if the stay for scientific maturity is necessary. In ad-
dition, placing the case on the docket, albeit an inactive one,
has two advantages over the dismissal mechanism discussed
above. First, it saves plaintiffs from the no-win situation of
choosing between immediate dismissal now for lack of mature
evidence and future dismissal later because the statute of limi-
tations has run. Stays toll the statute of limitations and wait
rather than dismiss on account of immature evidence. Second,
unlike dismissals, which can be interpreted as defense victories
and create defendant indifference, stays maintain litigation
pressure and encourage more research. 2'
120. See supra Part II.
121. Concededly, the availability of stays will reduce the defendants' incen-
tive to perform ex ante research, since they no longer have to fear being un-
prepared when the first suit arises. See Dresser et al., supra note 13, at 732-
34 (criticizing the lack of testing by manufacturers to ensure long-term prod-
uct safety). It may be impractical, however, to believe that defendants are able
2003]
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2. Institutional Resistance
An immediate criticism of this delay proposal may be that
it also is too radical. Certainly delay is not as fundamental a
change as restructuring the tort system, but it runs afoul of le-
gal traditions preferring expeditious dispute resolution. 2'
Purposeful delay in the law, however, is not as foreign as
one might initially suspect. For example, in recent years, many
states have developed "inactive dockets" to handle the flood ofasbesos " .... 123
asbestos litigation. Due to statute of limitations concerns,
large numbers of asbestos plaintiffs have been filing claims de-
spite the absence of any current physical harm.'24 Inactive
docket programs hold these "unimpaired" cases in abeyance,
freeing courts to give priority to hearing claims from plaintiffs
already stricken with cancer and other asbestos-related dis-
125
eases.
Precedent for stays in proceedings also exists elsewhere in
the law. In Watts, Watts & Co. v. Unione Austriaca di Naviga-
zione,26 the Supreme Court suggested the possibility of a stay
due to the then-current hostilities between the United States
and Austria-Hungary. 127 Moreover, under the abstention doc-
trine developed in Railroad Commission v. Pullman Co.,128 fed-
eral courts stay proceedings to allow state courts to resolve is-
sues of state law that may obviate the need to address
constitutional questions. 2 9
The idea of waiting for maturity is not particularly unusual
either. Although still controversial, some courts and commenta-
tors have advocated for "maturity"-here, the extent to which a
to anticipate and research unfiled claims, so any reduction in incentives may
be negligible.
122. See supra Part II.A.
123. See generally Mark A. Behrens & Monica G. Parham, Stewardship for
the Sick: Preserving Assets for Asbestos Victims Through Inactive Docket Pro-
grams, 33 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1 (2001) (providing an overview of inactive
docket programs).
124. Id. at 5.
125. See id. at 6-7. In addition, to the extent that most asbestos-producing
companies have already declared bankruptcy and possess limited resources,
the inactive docket programs also channel resources to ill plaintiffs, rather
than those who are merely at risk of developing illness. See id.
126. 248 U.S. 9 (1918).
127. See id. at 22-23 (creating, effectively, a stay in the proceedings until
the restoration of peace between the United States and Austria-Hungary).
128. R.R. Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
129. See id.
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particular claim has been repeatedly litigated-as a factor in
class action certification. 130 Indeed, the Manual for Complex
Litigation (Third) implies that maturity is a proper considera-
tion for certification, 13' and the Advisory Committee to the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure has proposed a subsection that
would make this explicit.1 32 Use of the maturity factor has pri-
marily been motivated by worries over the possibility of mas-
sive, one-time errors 33 and the attendant blackmail effects.
But in many ways, the concern about maturity also reflects a
tacit concession not only that trial processes and decisions im-
prove with each successive trial, but also that scientific evi-
dence may become more stable with time.
Finally, while any reform is likely to result in some inter-
est group opposition, one can surmise that a delay proposal
may be more acceptable than most reforms. The delay mecha-
nism would lower the standard of admissibility, which would
help plaintiffs, but would also create additional time for re-
search, which would generally help defendants. Consequently,
130. Compare Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 747-48 (5th Cir.
1996) (expressing doubts about a class action's predominance or superiority
due to the lack of a "past track record"), with Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,
417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) (holding that class certification should not involve a
preliminary or abbreviated merits inquiry). See generally Drucker, supra note
62, at 216 n.10 (discussing the controversy and citing various cases analyzing
it).
131. MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 33.26, at 360-61 (1997)
("Fairness may demand that mass torts with few prior verdicts or judgments
be litigated first in smaller units ... until general causation, typical injuries,
and levels of damages become established.").
132. See Nagareda, supra note 4, at 309-10 (reporting a proposed subsec-
tion to "Rule 23 that would direct judges to consider 'the extent, nature, and
maturity of any related litigation involving class members' as part of the class
certification determination" (citations omitted)). The Advisory Committee par-
ticularly mentioned the problem of "highly uncertain facts that may come to be
better understood over time" as one of the motivations behind the rule change.
Id. The Committee, however, has placed the proposal on hold indefinitely as of
1998. See also Drucker, supra note 62, at 215 (similarly advocating the need
for this maturity factor).
133. For this reason, some commentators have suggested using multiple
trials and sampling to diversify the error risks in class actions. See Michael J.
Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of
Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44 STAN. L. REV. 815
(1992). Sampling, of course, could not diversify the error risks of changing sci-
entific evidence because the sampling trials would occur over too brief a time.
134. See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1298 (7th Cir.
1995) (discussing the "blackmail settlements" induced by class actions). See
generally HENRY J. FRIENDLY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION: A GENERAL VIEW 120
(1973) (discussing "blackmail settlements" generally).
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each side has something to be happy about.
3. Other Problems
As foreseen in Part II.B, all delays impose waiting costs,
and the delay mechanism discussed here is no different.3 5
Plaintiffs are usually of limited means, and as potential victims
of a toxic tort, they are often in need of expensive medical
treatment. Imposition of a delay period therefore denies plain-
tiffs necessary funds during a critical time. Worse yet, during
the delay period plaintiffs may die or defendants may become
insolvent, making the maxim "Ij]ustice delayed is justice de-
nied" particularly ring true."6
Another problem with delay is that it allows specific causa-
tion evidence to degrade. As discussed in Part I.C, evidence of
specific causation-for example, how long and at what dosage
the plaintiff was exposed to the substance-degrades over
time. 13 During a four- or five-year delay, it would not be un-
usual for witnesses to move away, die, or otherwise become un-
available. Certainly, pretrial depositions and interrogatories
taken before the stay will mitigate this unavailability issue, but
fact finders will nonetheless be denied the benefits of assessing
live witnesses.
4. Alternatives
Changing the timing of the stay mechanism can signifi-
cantly reduce the above problems. For example, litigation could
be allowed to proceed through trial and jury deliberation, and
then the judge could postpone the entry of judgment for a fixed
period of time. Motions in opposition to the entry of judgment
or for judgment as a matter of law 8 could be accepted (or de-
nied) as the end of the postponement period neared.3 9 Allowing
the proceedings to continue through trial would remove the
135. See supra notes 93-100 and accompanying text.
136. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 833 (D.C.
1994) (Schwelb, J., concurring) (stressing the practical injustice of having
plaintiffs experience long delays in recovering damages); see also FED. R.
EVID. 102 (declaring one of the purposes of the Federal Rules of Evidence as
"elimination of unjustifiable expense and delay").
137. See supra notes 63-69 and accompanying text.
138. Like any other posttrial mechanism, implementation of a postjury
postponement must grapple with the additional issue of burdens of proof. See
infra Part III.D.3.
139. My thanks to Bob Bohrer for suggesting this procedural alternative.
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problem of degrading specific causation evidence. It would also
probably provide enough information for injunctions requiring
defendants to maintain sufficient funds to cover possible judg-
ments.
14
Of course, the later the stay mechanism appears in the
process, the more litigation resources are potentially wasted. In
a post-jury-deliberation stay, new scientific studies may require
many trial stages to be redone, whereas in a pretrial stay, there
would be fewer such inefficiencies. Appropriate placement of
the stay mechanism thus should depend on a cost-benefit
analysis. Factors in such an analysis would include the empiri-
cal frequency of "science reversals,"'4 ' since the greater the like-
lihood of relitigation, the more appropriate early stay mecha-
nisms are to minimize duplicate proceedings. Another
consideration would naturally be the expected costs of each
trial stage. For example, the costs of the actual trial might be
insignificant compared to the costs of discovery. If this is the
case, the benefits of placing the stay mechanism after trial may
justify its relatively minor costs."'42
D. RES JUDICATA AND POSTJUDGMENT RELIEF
Rather than addressing immature scientific evidence with
delays during litigation, courts could proceed directly to final
judgment but then offer some form of postjudgment relief if the
underlying science changes. For example, if sufficient scientific
studies arose during a predefined contingency period after final
judgment, courts could reopen litigation. Here, the length of
this contingency period would be linked to the scientific life cy-
cle.
140. The dynamics of the business environment and the poor institutional
ability of judges to police corporate decision making may, however, make these
injunctions impossible or ill advised in practice.
141. This empirical question may, however, be extremely difficult to an-
swer. See infra Part IV.
142. On the other hand, a more cynical view would suggest that if discov-
ery costs are prohibitive, defendants would be blackmailed into settlement
long before the stay mechanism could take effect. See Krista R. Stine, Silicone,
Science and Settlements: Breast Implants and a Search for Truth, 63 DEF.
COUNS. J. 491, 497 (1996) (suggesting that delaying does not help manufac-
turers because it is "doubtful that any amount of evidence will ever convince
some [breast] implant recipients that silicone implants are not responsible for
their illnesses" and that even with "science and juries on their side, the litiga-
tion costs will [be] monstrous").
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1. Res Judicata and Rule 60(b)
The immediate and pressing concern when discussing any
form of postjudgment relief is finality. As previously men-
tioned, res judicata has often been celebrated as a legal corner-143
stone, rendering as the Supreme Court once suggested,
"white that which is black, and straight that which is
crooked." The policies of the rule are well known: facilitating
private peace, 145 ensuring certainty in private and commercial
activities,' and conserving scarce judicial resources by pre-
venting duplicative, vexatious litigation.'47 Any attempt to relax
the strictures of res judicata and leave judgments contingent,
whether to account for changing scientific evidence or any other
reason, might therefore seem once again like a radical depar-
ture.
Fortunately, like delay, postjudgment relief is also not as
alien as it might initially appear. The seeds of flexibility have
already been planted under Rule 60(b) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 148 The exceptions to res judicata in Rule 60(b)
143. See, e.g., Reed v. Allen, 286 U.S. 191, 198-99 (1932) ("[Tlhe interest of
the state requires that there be an end to litigation."); 18 JAMES WM. MOORE
ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 131.12, at 131-20 to -21 (3d ed. 1997)
(discussing the interests in finality and describing claim preclusion as a "Pillar
of Modem Judicial Philosophy").
144. Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U.S. 352, 364 (1859); see also MOORE ETAL., supra
note 143, § 131.12, at 131-21 to -22 (reporting that the doctrine of res judicata
generally does not care if the judgment was right or wrong or whether the dis-
covery of additional facts would create a different outcome).
145. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 401 (1981) ("Pub-
lic policy dictates that there be an end of litigation ....'" (quoting Baldwin v.
Traveling Men's Ass'n., 283 U.S. 522, 525 (1931))). "[The] doctrine of res judi-
cata... is a rule of fundamental and substantive justice, of public policy and
private peace...." Id. (quoting Hart Steel Co. v. R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S.
294, 299 (1917)).
146. Comm'r v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 597 (1948) (describing the "public
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal relations").
147. Id. (noting "considerations of economy of judicial time"); 18 CHARLES
ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 4403 (2d ed.
2002) (discussing the "need to ration access to a scare public resource").
148. Rule 60(b) reads in part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a
party or a party's legal representative from a final judgment, order, or
proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, sur-
prise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence which by
due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denomi-
nated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or other misconduct
of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the judgment has
been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment upon
346
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are extremely narrow as currently understood,'49 but effective
handling of changing scientific evidence would only require an
extension of res judicata's provisions and policies, not a sea
change in legal practice.
150
Rule 60(b) has three subsections that are relevant to
changing scientific evidence. The most significant subsection is
60(b)(2), which allows relief from judgment for "newly discov-
ered evidence which by due diligence could not have been dis-
covered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b)." 151
Rule 60(b)(2) currently has two significant limitations."2 First,
it requires that the evidence existed at the time of trial."3 It is
unclear whether new epidemiological or scientific studies sat-
isfy this requirement because while the scientific "fact" existed
before trial (in the sense that it has always existed), the scien-
tific studies did not."' Second, 60(b)(2) requires that motions
which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective applica-
tion; or (6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the
judgment. The motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and
for reasons (1), (2), and (3) not more than one year after the judg-
ment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken ....
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
149. MOORE ET AL., supra note 143, § 131.21, at 131-40 to -41 (reporting
that "the exception (if indeed it is an exception) is much narrower than the
language used in some of the cases implies").
150. See Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 77 (5th Cir.
1970) ("The provisions of this rule [60(b)] must be carefully interpreted to pre-
serve the delicate balance between the sanctity of final judgments, expressed
in the doctrine of res judicata, and the incessant command of the court's con-
science that justice be done in light of all the facts.").
151. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b)(2).
152. Besides the two limitations discussed here, Rule 60(b)(2) also requires
that the new evidence be noncumulative and outcome determinative. See infra
Part III.D.3.
153. See Johnson v. Offshore Express, Inc., 845 F.2d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir.
1988) (holding that the "'[newly discovered evidence' under Rule 60(b)(2) ...
must be evidence of facts existing at the time of the original trial"); see also 11
CHARLEs ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2808
(2d ed. 1995).
154. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 830 (D.C.
1994) (discussing the difficulties of making this determination). It is possible
to interpret the requirement as merely an attempt to exclude postjudgment
relief for so-called "changed circumstances"; in that case, new scientific studies
about existent facts should qualify for relief. Professor Green, however, be-
lieves that the argument proves too much because new scientific evidence will
always be about a fact that existed at trial. See Michael D. Green, The Road
Less Well Traveled (and Seen): Contemporary Lawmaking in Products Liabil-
ity, 49 DEPAuL L. REV. 377, 394 n.96 (1999).
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for relief be made within one year of final judgment. '55 The one-
year window is clearly insufficient for handling changing scien-
tific evidence and would have to be expanded to account for the
lengthier life cycle.
Another relevant subsection is 60(b)(5), which creates an
exception to res judicata when it is "no longer equitable that
the judgment should have prospective application."'56 Rule
60(b)(5), however, grants only prospective relief,' and may
only be useful in class actions 158 or other cases in which funds
are set up for periodic distribution. And because funds (how-
ever arranged) are essentially money damage payments, even
they may not qualify for 60(b)(5) relief under current practice.
Finally, Rule 60(b) in general states that it "does not limit
the power of a court to entertain an independent action to re-
lieve a party from a judgment.""9 There is no time limit on an
independent action for relief, except for laches,' 6 0 but the tradi-
tional doctrine requires fraud or mistake and is extremely
strict.16 ' That requirement probably precludes use of independ-
155. FED. R. CIv. P. 60(b).
156. FED. R. CIrV. P. 60(b)(5). Unlike Rule 60(b)(2), which seems to disfavor
changed-circumstances arguments, 60(b)(5) embraces them. Cf. FDIC v. Alker,
234 F.2d 113, 116 n.4 (3d Cir. 1956) (suggesting that 60(b)(5) only applies to
cases in which judgment "is rendered prospectively inequitable by subsequent
events"); 11 WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 153, § 2863, at 332-33, 337-38, 337
n. 13 (observing that courts are more willing to grant this form of relief when
judgment is prospective and there is no disentangling of previous payments).
157. FED. R. Crv. P. 60(b)(5). This limitation presumably comes from
60(b)(5)'s origins in the general power of an equity court to modify a final de-
cree. See 11A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 153, § 2961, at 391-93; accord United
States v. W. Elec. Co., 46 F.3d 1198, 1202 (D.C. Cir. 1995); N.Y. State Ass'n for
Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 967 (2d Cir. 1983) ("The power
of a court of equity to modify a decree of injunctive relief is long-established,
broad, and flexible."); cf. Miller v. French, 530 U.S. 327, 344-45 (2000) (hold-
ing that injunctive relief does not constitute a final judgment for purposes of
separation-of-powers analysis under Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S.
211 (1995)).
158. Given that 60(b)(5) originated in the courts of equity, the similarly eq-
uitable origins of the class action suit may render it particularly susceptible to
60(b)(5) relief. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 41 (1940) ("The class suit
was an invention of equity to enable it to proceed to a decree in suits where
the number of those interested in the subject of the litigation is so great that
their joinder as parties in conformity to the usual rules of procedure is imprac-
ticable.").
159. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
160. Crosby v. Mills, 413 F.2d 1273, 1276 (10th Cir. 1969).
161. See Bankers Mortgage Co. v. United States, 423 F.2d 73, 79 (5th Cir.
1970). The requirements for relief under an independent action are:
(1) a judgment which ought not, in equity and good conscience, to be
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ent actions for relief in cases of changing scientific evidence.
The significance of these 60(b) exceptions is not that they
can currently provide relief in changing scientific evidence
cases. Indeed, they likely cannot. Rule 60(b)(2) has a one-year
limitation; 60(b)(5) offers only prospective relief; and independ-
ent actions require fraud or mistake. What is important, how-
ever, is that the exceptions demonstrate that res judicata has
been relaxed in the past for certain, albeit narrowly defined,
cases. 16 They thus provide departure points for future legisla-
tion or common law development. 163
2. Benefits
The primary benefit of using postjudgment relief to ad-
dress changing scientific evidence is that it eliminates the wait-
ing costs that plague delay mechanisms. Deciding cases imme-
diately and distributing awards assures victims adequate funds
for medical treatment in the interim. Plaintiffs no longer have
enforced; (2) a good defense to the alleged cause of action on which
the judgment is founded; (3) fraud, accident, or mistake which pre-
vented the defendant in the judgment from obtaining the benefit of
his defense; (4) the absence of fault or negligence on the part of de-
fendant; and (5) the absence of any adequate remedy at law.
Id. (quoting Nat'l Sur. Co. v. State Bank of Humboldt, 120 F.2d 593, 599 (8th
Cir. 1903)).
162. There is even subsection 60(b)(6), which grants relief in "extraordi-
nary circumstances' and only when such action is necessary to accomplish jus-
tice." Lyons v. Jefferson Bank & Trust, 994 F.2d 716, 729 (10th Cir. 1993)
(quoting Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 n.11
(1988)); see also FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6); cf Kara L. McCall, Comment, Medi-
cal Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims for Disease, 66 U. CHI. L.
REV. 969, 996 (1999) (suggesting that although "60(b)(6) is used only rarely, it
may provide a textual hook for a court seeking to allow a second suit based on
development of disease").
163. Indeed, many courts have read the exceptions not as discrete,
autonomous safety valves, but as part of a holistic policy that grants relief
from final judgments when justice (or policy) warrants it. See, e.g., In re Four
Seasons Sec. Laws Litig., 502 F.2d 834, 841 (10th Cir. 1974) (suggesting that
when "the motion is timely filed under any of the 60(b) clauses, the court
should not be bound by a strict categorization of particular claims"); Bankers
Mortgage, 423 F.2d at 77 n.7 (noting that a 60(b) motion and an independent
motion for relief can be treated interchangeably as long as the adverse party is
not prejudiced); Note, Federal Rule 60(b): Relief from Civil Judgments, 61
YALE L.J. 76, 82 (1952) (observing that the Supreme Court's principle that the
clauses of 60(b) "are mutually exclusive has not been adhered to in practice");
id. at 84-86 (advocating the abolition of the time limit on 60(b)(3) because
courts use 60(b)(6) to evade the one-year limitation anyway). But see Four
Seasons, 502 F.2d at 841 (refusing to allow 60(b)(6) to "frustrate the one-year
limitation").
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to wait an additional four or five years for their recovery.
Postjudgment relief also exhibits the advantages character-
istic of delay mechanisms that operate late in the litigation
process. Because trial is conducted right away, evidence of spe-
cific causation does not degrade. In addition, as awards are
made immediately, there is no longer any danger of defendants
squandering or otherwise depleting their assets en route to
bankruptcy.' 4
Finally, because defendants are able to reclaim adverse
judgments if science changes during the contingency period,
they will continue to have significant incentives to conduct and
fund research. Of course, the threat of future lawsuits created
by an adverse judgment always creates incentives for research,
but to the extent that class actions resolve most future claims
and thereby squelch research under current practice, expand-
ing postjudgment relief would improve incentives in that con-
text.
3. Burdens of Proof
Unlike pretrial delays, which simply facilitate the intro-
duction of more evidence, any posttrial mechanism... must
grapple with the question of how much contrary evidence is
necessary to overturn a previous jury decision or warrant a re-
trial. Current 60(b)(2) doctrine sets an extremely high standard
of review: New evidence must be noncumulative'66 and outcome
determinative.6 1 Presumably, this high standard is meant to
preclude bothersome and fruitless relitigation in ordinary
cases. ' Such a difficult standard of review, however, may be
164. See Abraham, supra note 102, at 868-69 (observing that long delays
between the actions that produce injuries and the final resolution of tort
claims offer greater opportunities "for the commercial creditors and owners of
the responsible enterprise to divert their assets and thereby to preclude tort
claimants from recovering their losses").
165. This includes not only 60(b)-type postjudgment relief, but also the
posttrial delays discussed in Part III.C.4.
166. WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 153, § 2859, at 307-08.
167. E.g., Brown v. Petrolite Corp., 965 F.2d 38, 50 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating
that a 60(b)(2) motion requires that the evidence is "material and controlling
and clearly would have produced a different result"); see also McCall, supra
note 162, at 995 (reporting that 60(b)(2) attempts are rarely successful be-
cause courts have often found the new evidence not to be outcome determina-
tive).
168. Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Oxendine, 649 A.2d 825, 832 (D.C. 1994)
(suggesting that, without the high bar of outcome determinacy, the continual
availability of new information would make the 60(b)(2) regime unworkable);
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undesirable in the changing scientific evidence context. To the
extent that one expects the scientific literature to mature and
improve over time, there is no reason why early guesses by fact
finders should carry overwhelming weight. After all, the pri-
mary reason for selecting a 60(b)-type solution over a delay-
type solution is to provide plaintiffs access to interim funds, not
to raise bars for defendants.
In the end, however, any flexibility in modifying the stan-
dard for postjudgment relief in the changing scientific evidence
context may be restricted by constitutional considerations. 9
The right to jury trial may require a standard at least as strin-
gent as that used for judgments as a matter of law. Such a limi-
tation would clearly hinder the operation of a postjudgment re-
lief solution, but in theory it would remain available in
egregious cases of scientific reversals, such as the silicone and
spermicide cases. 7 0
4. The Problem of Defendant Recovery
Even if postjudgment relief sounds promising in the ab-
stract, the financial situation of disease-stricken plaintiffs
raises concerns about its practical feasibility. Plaintiffs often
will be of limited means and may spend most if not all of the
judgment on medical expenses and other needs during the con-
tingency period. In other words, even if defendants succeed in
see also Stine, supra note 142, at 498 (arguing that "[miultiple studies could
translate into multiple re-openings").
169. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 750 (5th Cir. 1996);
In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1303 (7th Cir. 1995) (describing
the Seventh Amendment as providing "a right to have juriable issues deter-
mined by the first jury impaneled to hear them... and not reexamined by an-
other finder of fact"); Nagareda, supra note 4, at 302, 302 n.24 (elaborating on
the Seventh Amendment reservations of courts to allow the reexamination of
jury verdicts).
170. Seventh Amendment doctrine, of course, rests on a historical inquiry
based on the traditional distinctions between law and equity. See Curtis v.
Loether, 415 U.S. 189, 193 (1974). Thus, to the extent that the changing scien-
tific evidence problem occurs in complex litigation, the controversy surround-
ing whether class actions are in law or in equity offers the possibility that the
right to jury trial would not apply in those cases at all. Compare Morris S. Ar-
nold, A Historical Inquiry into the Right to Trial by Jury in Complex Civil
Litigation, 128 U. PA. L. REV. 829, 848 (1980) ("There... seems to be no good
historical foundation for the argument that plaintiffs may be denied the right
to a jury trial because their cases are complex."), with Patrick Devlin, Jury
Trial of Complex Cases: English Practice at the Time of the Seventh Amend-
ment, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 43, 65-77 (1980) (arguing that juries were not his-
torically used in complex cases).
2003]
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obtaining postjudgment relief, it may be a rather hollow vic-
tory.
A partial solution to the judgment-proof plaintiff problem
would be to structure liability awards into something akin to a
trust fund during the contingency period. 7' The trust fund
would pay out periodically to cover necessary medical expenses,
and only at the expiration of the contingency period would the
plaintiff then be entitled to the remainder. Perhaps surpris-
ingly for some, such a periodic payment scheme would be a
minimal departure from current practice, and is quite consis-
tent with various state statutes permitting the imposition of
periodic payments in medical malpractice cases.1 7 2
Trust funds are not perfect. They guarantee defendants re-
covery of only a fraction of the original judgment.7 3 Indeed,de-
pending on the medical condition of the plaintiff, the guaran-
teed fraction may be extremely small. At the same time, they
deprive ultimately vindicated plaintiffs of full use of their
award during the contingency period, a hardship particularly
poignant for plaintiffs with terminal illnesses. Nonetheless,
trust funds may represent a reasonable compromise by allow-
ing plaintiffs to have some interim funds while also guarantee-
ing defendants a meaningful possibility of postjudgment relief.
5. Searching for Certainty
The expanded possibility of postjudgment relief may also
be highly unsettling to both plaintiffs and defendants. Suffer-
171. The problem of the judgment-proof plaintiff would disappear entirely
if one could replace individual plaintiffs with large, well-funded health insur-
ance companies, as advocated by David Rosenberg. Rosenberg's proposal of
removing limits on first-party insurance subrogation would allow large first-
party insurers to aggregate their clients' claims and sue risk-creating manu-
facturers for risk-based harms. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at
101-02. Besides eliminating the judgment-proof plaintiff problem, the scheme
would also minimize litigation costs because insurers could take advantage of
scale economies and would not theoretically need to prove specific causation
(since the insurers would represent the general population). Id. at 100-02.
172. Ellen S. Pryor, After the Judgment, 88 VA. L. REV. 1757, 1771-74
(2002) (discussing the rise of statutes permitting mandated periodic payments
over the past twenty-five years). Some of these statutes even relieve defen-
dants of certain payment obligations upon the plaintiffs death. See, e.g., id. at
1773 n.49 (providing other examples).
173. Plaintiffs' attorneys' fees could also be subject to recapture, further
minimizing the gap. Putting attorneys' fees at risk would have the added ad-
vantage of encouraging plaintiffs' attorneys to bring suit only when the scien-
tific evidence is reasonably mature or is sufficiently robust to suggest that it
will be confirmed by future studies.
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ing from an illness and perhaps wanting to get on with their
lives, plaintiffs may find it unnerving-or at least unpleasant-
to live with the possibility of having their "award" taken away
several years later. Defendants will have similar concerns, pre-
suming that postjudgment relief is symmetric and available to
plaintiffs as well. The threat of future liability and possible in-
solvency hinders a corporation's access to financial markets
and other business opportunities, and weakening finality may
make it more difficult for defendants to reestablish themselves
in the business world.
174
The quickest method of reaching certainty is, of course, set-
tlement. 175 But even without settlement, one could expect that
some type of insurance or security market would develop to ad-
dress these uncertainties. For example, risk-averse plaintiffs
might sell their trust funds to risk-neutral financial institu-
tions in exchange for a risk-discounted (but guaranteed) lump
sum. These financial institutions could then diversify the risk
of changing scientific evidence among multiple cases. Defen-
dants might similarly buy insurance to protect against plain-
tiffs' reopening judgments and obtaining larger awards.
Whether insurance companies or other financial institu-
tions would be willing to insure these types of risks is unclear.
Though it can presumably be modeled, the probability that sci-
entific evidence will change is not necessarily as easy to calcu-
late as the probability of automobile accidents or home fires.
Furthermore, the absence of a large number of litigated toxic
substances may make risk diversification difficult, especially
when the aggregate amounts at stake for any particular sub-
stance are immense. 176 These problems may explain why many
174. See Abraham, supra note 102, at 869 (suggesting that resolving claims
early removes the "sword of Damocles" that inhibits the availability of capital
markets and mergers); Feldman, supra note 12, at 43 (arguing that it will be
difficult for defendants "to keep their business affairs in good order if it took
longer than it already does to put a price tag on liability exposure").
175. Since settlement's only purpose is arguably to reduce litigation risks
and to ensure certainty, postjudgment relief would not be available against
settlements negotiated on the basis of later-discredited scientific evidence. Cf.
Stine, supra note 142, at 497-98 (arguing that a reopen clause in a settlement
agreement would not help any side because it would cause "the matter to re-
main in flux for years").
176. For example, in the aftermath of September 11th, skyscraper owners
expressed concern about obtaining adequate terrorism insurance without gov-
erinent intervention. Joseph B. Treaster, Senate Passes Aid to Insurers on
Terrorism, N.Y. TIMES, June 19, 2002, at C1.
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accident risks at present lack viable insurance markets. 7
CONCLUSION
In the summer of 2002, a study by the Women's Health Ini-
tiative reported that the hormone replacement therapy drug
Prempro increased women's risks of breast cancer and various
forms of heart disease.' By week's end, the first class action
suit had already been filed against Prempro manufacturer
Wyeth Laboratories. 179 The Women's Health study appears to
be scientifically solid, 8 ° and future studies may ultimately con-
firm that Prempro is indeed hazardous. But the surprising na-
ture of the results and the flurry of activity sparked by the re-
port suggest that researchers will be busily verifying the study
in the near future. l Courts may be once again facing another
177. See FRIED & ROSENBERG, supra note 101, at 26.
178. Writing Group for the Women's Health Initiative Investigators, Risks
and Benefits of Estrogen Plus Progestin in Healthy Postmenopausal Women:
Principal Results from the Women's Health Initiative Randomized Controlled
Trial, 288 JAMA 321 (2002); see also Suzanne W. Fletcher & Graham A.
Colditz, Failure of Estrogen Plus Progestin Therapy for Prevention, 288 JAMA
366 (2002) (discussing Prempro as the medication used in hormone replace-
ment therapy).
179. See National Class Actions Filed over Estrogen Replacement Drug,
ANDREWS MASS TORT LITIG. REPORTER, Aug. 2002, at 14; Ronald D. White,
Wyeth Hit with Class Action Alleging Damage from Drug, L.A. TIMES, July 12,
2002, at C3. Within a month, there were already six class actions pending
against Wyeth, not only in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania, but also in
the Northern District of Illinois and state courts in Pennsylvania and Florida.
Wyeth Reports 6 Pending Prempro Class Actions, 1 MEALEY'S PROD. LIAB. &
RISK 21 (2002) (citing Wyeth's Form 10-Q filing with the Securities and Ex-
change Commission); see also, e.g., Drug Preemption Defense Not a Federal
Question; Prempro Class Remanded, 3 MEALEY'S LITIG. REPORT: CLASS
ACTIONS 24 (2003) (discussing the Prempro class action case in Alabama);
TEX. LAW., Oct. 28, 2002, at 4 (describing the filing of Sherry House Zanter v.
Wyeth Pharmaceuticals on October 18, 2002, in Bexar County, Texas, seeking
$10 million in actual damages and $150 million in punitive damages).
180. Fletcher & Colditz, supra note 178, at 366-67. The Women's Health
Initiative study used what is viewed as the "gold standard" for medical re-
search-a randomized controlled trial. The thousands of participants were
randomly assigned to either the placebo (control) group or the Prempro (ex-
perimental) group. Gina Kolata, Hormone Studies: What Went Wrong?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2003, at Fl. Previous studies were at best observational stud-
ies, in which subjects reported and decided on their own usage of Prempro. Id.
181. Given the observed hazards, approval for another randomized clinical
trial of Prempro is unlikely to be forthcoming. Jane E. Brody, Sorting Through
the Confusion over Estrogen, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 3, 2002, at Fl. Researchers
may, however, resort to other means of data collection, because Prempro will
probably continue to be used when women and their doctors conclude that its
benefits still outweigh its risks. See id.
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case in which the applicable scientific evidence is not yet ma-
ture.
So what should the legal system do? This Article notes that
one solution is to address the possibility of changing scientific
evidence through delay mechanisms. Courts could take imme-
diate steps to preserve the evidence of specific causation
through depositions and interrogatories, and then stay the liti-
gation in anticipation of confirmatory studies. To spur research,
the length of the stay would be fixed, and could even be short-
ened if the judge determines that ethical or other considera-
tions make further studies unlikely. In the interim, however,
victims would be deprived of funds needed for medical treat-
ment, and defendants could deplete their reserves or become
insolvent. 182
As an alternative, this Article suggests a postjudgment re-
lief mechanism. Courts could proceed without delay directly to
judgment, but thereafter, during a predetermined contingency
period, the judgment would remain open to assault if over-
whelming contrary evidence should appear. Under this scheme,
however, defendants would be the ones more likely disadvan-
taged. In the absence of a trust fund, it would be extremely dif-
ficult to recover from plaintiffs, who would invariably spend the
reward on medical and other expenses. Even with a trust fund,
only a fraction of the original judgment would remain pro-
tected.
Which solution is the better one? That may depend on one's
confidence in early studies. If early studies are likely to be dis-
credited by later ones, then the delay solution may be prefer-
able. There is no reason to proceed to final judgment, tie up de-
fendant resources, and risk their dispersal if the judgment will
probably be reversed. i 3 Likewise, if early studies are likely to
be confirmed, then the postjudgment relief solution may be
preferable. Then, at least plaintiffs will have the funds needed
for treatment, while defendants still have a safety valve (albeit
imperfect) for the relatively rare instances in which it is
needed. Determining the general reliability of early studies,
however, may well be impossible. We might try to examine the
182. See Melody Petersen, Wyeth Stock Falls 24% After Report, N.Y. TIMES,
July 10, 2002, at A16.
183. At the same time, there is no reason to hold the preliminary studies
inadmissible and grant the defendant summary judgment, because that would
preclude plaintiff recovery even if later studies indeed confirmed the earlier
ones.
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problem empirically, but the sheer variety of how early studies
are done-in rigor, sample size, technique, etc.-may swamp
any attempt to derive a generally applicable trend. Besides, if
we were really confident that an early study would be con-
firmed (or discredited), there would be little need to perform
the confirmatory study in the first place. Indeed, the entire
problem of changing scientific evidence would practically dis-
appear.
So choosing the best solution may ultimately boil down to a
policy choice over who should bear the interim risks and costs
while the science matures. Under the delay mechanism, plain-
tiffs shoulder the waiting costs and risk future defendant insol-
vency. Under the postjudgment relief mechanism, defendants
face the risk of being unable to recover erroneous judgments
and lose the use of the disputed funds in the interim. Some will
argue that defendants should bear the risks, emphasizing the
responsibility of defendants for failing to perform adequate re-
search, or focusing on plaintiffs in dire need of extensive medi-
cal treatment. Others will argue that plaintiffs should bear the
risks instead, noting the higher incidence of judgment-proof
plaintiffs and the social costs of depriving consumers of ulti-
mately exonerated products.
But regardless of where one's sympathies lie, this Article
suggests that there is one choice that is clearly wrong-and
that is to do nothing at all. It is in that spirit that this Article
hopes to mark the start of a difficult discussion on the problem
of changing scientific evidence.
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